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11. Dogmas of Superficiality:
The Episteme of Humanism in Writings by Taiwanese
Historians Huang Chun-chieh, Wong Young-tsu, and Hu
Chang-Tze
In his essay On the Transformation of Historical Thinking in Modern China,1 the
Taiwanese scholar Hu Chang-Tze (胡昌智 Hū Chāngzhì) identifies a series of
conceptual developments that constitute cardinal nodes in the history of ideas of
Chinese modernity. In essence, these include Zhāng Xuéchéng’s (章學誠, 1738–
1801)2 new sense of ‘historicism’ with regard to the Confucian classics; Kāng
Yǒuwéi’s (康有為, 1858–1927) and Liáng Qı̌chāo’s (梁啟超, 1873–1929) pro-
gressivist theories of historical periodization; Liáng Shùmíng’s (梁漱溟 1893–
1988) cultural ‘pluralism’ of contrasting Chinese culture against India and the
West; and Qián Mù’s (錢穆, 1895–1990) pioneering of a new Chinese historical
writing style employing grand narrative.
These nodes reveal a growth of Chinese ideas that approximately resemble
dominant concepts within the Occidental episteme3 of humanism, although this
is not a topic that is directly discussed in Hu’s essay. Zhāng Xuéchéng’s his-
toricism matches the secularism implicit in European classical and biblical
philology. The progressivist vision espoused by Kāng Yǒuwéi and Liáng Qı̌chāo
mirrors Hegel’s modernist historical teleology. Liáng Shùmíng’s cultural plu-
ralism brings to mind the global perspective of eighteenth-century European
universal histories.4 Likewise, Qián Mù’s use of grand narrative echoes the
overarching historical causality embedded in much of Western nineteenth-
century historiography.
1 Published in this volume.
2 In the present essay, traditional Chinese characters as used in Taiwan are listed first, given that
the topic of discussion is a series of essays by Taiwanese scholars. For the sake of inclusivity and
readability, simplified Chinese characters (abbreviated ‘S’) as used in the People’s Republic of
China are also supplied in those cases where the simplified characters differ from the tradi-
tional characters.
3 For the term episteme denoting a ‘power-knowledge system’, see Michel Foucault, Les mots et
les choses: une archéologie des sciences humaines, Paris: Gallimard, 1966, p. 13.
4 For example, George Sale et alii, An Universal History, from the Earliest Account of Time to the
Present, 65 vol. London: Edward Bate, 1747–1768.
The seeming correspondences between Western and Chinese thought raises
the question of whether these conceptual developments in modern Chinese
historical thinking resulted exclusively from internal factors rooted in the tra-
ditional, premodern Chinese power-knowledge system, coincidentally bearing a
resemblance to similar Western ideas, or whether they emanated from the ex-
ternal agency of Occidental humanism as propagated through the growing sway
of Western-style education. Although Hu briefly mentions the fascination with
Western culture and political ideologies that fermented in China during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the concrete extent to which early
modern Chinese historians were exposed to and possibly influenced by Western
historical thinking is left unexamined in his essay. The result is a characterization
of modern Chinese historical thinking that to a certain degree visualizes the
Chinese history of ideas as standing in relative isolation from the broader global
context in general and from the epistemic force of the humanist history of ideas
in particular.
Oppositely, two essays by the Taiwanese historians Huang Chun-chieh (黃俊
傑, Huáng Jùnjié) and Wong Young-tsu (汪榮祖, Wāng Róngzǔ) concerned with
identifying key features of classical Chinese history writing – respectively entitled
Historical Thinking as Humanistic Thinking in Traditional China and Human-
ism in Traditional Chinese Historiography with Special Reference to the Grand
Historian Sima Qian5 – opt to describe the ancient Chinese literary tradition of
shı̌ (史) comparatively in the language of humanism. While Huang does not
qualify his use of the term ‘humanism’, Wong begins his article by recognizing
that humanism signifies a specific historical mode in the European history of
ideas that consists in seeking meaning in the study of human culture as opposed
to the theological study of the divine.
It ought to be realized, however, that the word ‘humanism’ in general implies a
distinct Western intellectual tradition that utilizes an academic epistemology of
historicism and moreover involves an explicit political project of secular lib-
eralism. Nonetheless, both Huang and Wong not only conceive of the age-old
Chinese tradition of shı̌ as ‘history’ in accordancewith the dominant connotation
of the English word instead of conforming to any indigenous Chinese definition
of the term, but they also proceed at length to essentialize the writings of Sı̄mǎ
Qiān (司馬遷, c. 145–86 BCE) and other classical Chinese shı̌ writers as being
works of ‘humanistic’ thinking. Hence, in an utterly anatopistic and anachron-
isticmanner, i. e. , entirely out of place and out of time, they lift humanism out of
its historical context and raise it to the status of a universal, timeless topos
constituting an idealized yardstick against which tomeasure the value of Chinese
culture.
5 Both published in this volume.
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There can be little doubt that the felt need for apologetically appraising the
Chinese shı̌ tradition in terms of Occidental humanism results from the now
global hegemony of the higher educational system of the humanities, which
humanism underpins as its episteme. The Western-style humanities, which are
socially and politically anchored in the institution of themodern university, have
everywhere become the preferred – indeed even the compulsory – dogma for
studying culture and the human past.
Yet, it must be stressed that the current intellectual climate is a historical
outcome of the colonial as well as postcolonial epochs of modernity. Humanism
and the humanities, in their multiple variant forms worldwide, are systems of
knowledge production that are founded on the exclusion not only of theology but
also of the epistemologies of premodern non-Western power-knowledge systems





newly foundedWestern-style universities in nineteenth-century India.6 From this
global historical perspective of modern knowledge production, it therefore
comes as little surprise that the Chinese shı̌ tradition in the essays by Huang and
Wong is measured against Western humanism, especially since intercultural
communication is subject to the language in which it is expressed, in this case
English. For all that, it may be worth bearing in mind that if China prior to the
wave of European colonization had capitalized on its invention of gunpowder
and its highly developed maritime seafaring abilities and had thereby exploited
other nations as colonies, world history would have taken a different turn in the
tenth to fifteenth centuries and it would today probably be Western scholars
attempting to typecast the epistemic values of Chinese Confucianism onto the
Occidental traditions of historiography rather than the other way around.
Hence, extolling humanism as a universal ideal is not merely a product of the
colonial and post-colonial history of ideas entailing a certain geo-political
agenda, but is a hermeneutical program that is closely tied in with current trends
in the humanities worldwide. These trends include the disciplinary move from
world history to global history,7 the institutional move from humanities to global
humanities, and the epistemic move from humanism to global humanism. In
short, Chinese ‘historiography’ itself as well as the contemporary descriptions of
Chinese historical thinking given by Hu, Huang, and Wong are all instances of
“meaning-production [engaged] in an interpretive treatment of the pastˮ,8 and as
6 See Sheldon Pollock, “Crisis in the Classics”, in: Social Research 78.1 (2011), pp. 21–48, p. 30.
7 See OkamotoMichihiro (岡本充弘), “AnAnswer to the Question, ‘Is There a Global Approach
to History?’”, in: Tōyō Daigaku Ningenkagaku Sōgōkenkyūsho Purojekuto Hōkoku (東洋大学
人間科学総合研究所プロジェクト報告), vol. 1 (2011), pp. 67–73.
8 JörnRüsen, “Historik: Umriss einer Theorie der Geschichtswissenschaft”, in:Erwägen,Wissen,
Ethik 22.4 (2011), p. 478. The quotation is translated from German: “… Sinnbildung im
deutenden Umgang mit der Vergangenheit …”.
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meaning-production (Sinnbildung)9 they are constructions of a past ruled by
present hermeneutical horizons10 of regimes of historicity.11
1. Dependency and the Interplay of Power-Knowledge Systems
Hu’s description of key conceptual nodes in modern Chinese historical thinking
that tacitly resemble ideas known from Western thought as well as Huang’s and
Wong’s characterizations of classicalChinese historical thinking asbeing humanist
in the Occidental sense of the word are fundamentally concerned with how ideas
have flowed in and out of the Chinese power-knowledge system. The flow is either
thought to have taken place in the past in Hu’s sense of borrowing foreign ideas or
interpretively through Huang’s and Wong’s contemporary adaptation of the
Western concept of humanism in their portrayals of Chinese historiography.
Theoretically speaking, these in- and outflows of ideas may be designated as an
interplay between different power-knowledge systems. The word interplay is here
meant to suggest a process of intellectual appropriation,12 where an idea derived
from one episteme is adopted by a second episteme reigning on an equal or
submissive cultural-political footing. That is to say, in the phrase “Chinese his-
torical thinking” the label ‘Chinese’ singularizes a power-knowledge system in
nationalist cultural terms, which sets this system apart from but also in contra-
distinction to foreign power-knowledge systems of other national cultural
spheres.13
In some earlier scholarship,14 this interplay of ideas has been viewed as a
dynamic of uneven dependency whereby new ideas invariably are obtained from
9 It should be noted that Rüsen’s own English translation for the German term Sinnbildung is
“sense generation” or “historical sense generation”. In the present essay, the English eu-
phemism “meaning-production” shall be used instead, as a counterpart to the Foucaultian
term “knowledge productionˮ, in order to indicate that semiotically-based ‘meanings’ of the
past always remain ephemeral and unstable due to their perpetual production and re-
production through academic and non-academic discourses.
10 Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, New York: Crossroad, 1992, pp. 438–491.
11 Cf. François Hartog, Régimes d’historicité: Présentisme et experiences du temps, Paris: Édi-
tions du Seuil, 2003.
12 For a theoretical discussion of the term ‘appropriation’ in terms of subjectivity but not, as
here, between larger power-knowledge systems, seeUlrich TimmeKragh, “Appropriation and
Assertion of the Female Self”, in: Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 27.2 (2011), pp. 85–
108.
13 For the singularity versus contradistinction of cultures with regard to literatures, see Haun
Saussy, Great Walls of Discourse and Other Adventures in Cultural China, Cambridge: Har-
vard Univ. Press, 2001, p. 16.
14 Roberto Schwarz, “Misplaced Ideas: Literature and Society in Late Nineteenth-Century
Brazilˮ, in: Misplaced Ideas: Essays on Brazilian Culture, London: Verso, 1992, pp. 19–32.
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a favored cultural core and are then displaced, or even misplaced, in a disfavored
cultural periphery. The favored cultural core is said to be comprised of the
economically more developed Western nation states, whereas the disfavored
cultural periphery consists of economically dependent, less developed non-
Western states.15 Accordingly, it would have to follow that use of the Occidental
terms ‘humanism’ (人文主義 rénwénzhǔyì or 人本主義 rénběnzhǔyì), ‘aca-
demic thinking’ (學術思想 xuéshù sı̄xiǎng), and ‘history’ (i. e. , modern Chinese
歷史 lìshı̌ as opposed to classical Chinese史 shı̌) in a discourse dealing with the
Chinese history of ideas tacitly implies an inevitable predominance of a superior
West as well as the episteme of the European history of ideas and the dogma of
global humanism. Interplay would consequently have to be interpreted as a
displacement that entails a certain degree of artificiality amounting to ‘kitsch’,16
since it involves a cultural imitation that places something outside its normal
context, thereby producing a deformed false consciousness.17
However, construing interplay as dependency and misplacement must be
criticized for remaining superficial and insufficient. While the dependency
theory of ideas (依附思想理論 yı̄fù sı̄xiǎng lı̌lùn) offers a suitable starting point
for discussing the question of what role the Occidental history of ideas plays in
Chinese historical thinking when Hu identifies developments in early modern
Chinese history writing that seem to correspond to Western ideas and when
Huang and Wong portray classical Chinese historiography using European
terms, the theory at the same time overlooks four successively deeper layers of
meaning-production, including the ideological, the cultural, the semantical, and
the syntactical.
2. The Ideological
On the most general level, the dependency theory of ideas assumes that ideas
from the dominant core episteme are consistently accepted outright bymembers
of the alternative, so-called ‘peripheral’ power-knowledge systems. NewWestern
ideas are thus thought invariably to be viewed as ‘progressive’ or even ‘revolu-
tionary’ within non-Western societies. Nonetheless, even a cursory historical
15 Ibid. , pp. 23–24. For a broader post-colonial critique of the supremacy of Western thought,
see Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Diffe-
rence, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
16 For kitsch as one of the distinct forms of culture, see Ulrich Timme Kragh, “Of Pop, Kitsch,
and Cultural Heritageˮ, in: The Newsletter 62 (International Institute for Asian Studies 2012),
pp. 8–9, p. 9.
17 On false consciousness in the context of kitsch and musicological aesthetics, see Theodor W.
Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997, p. 239.
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examination reveals that this has far from always been the case. Alien ideas are
regularly viewedwith suspicion andmet with resistance, and this also goes for the
basic principles of historicism and secularism that lie at the heart of the hu-
manities. In the Islamic world, for example, ‘Occidentalism’ – understood as the
reverse of Western ‘Orientalism’ – has remained an enduringmode of ideological
defiance against the rootlessness of Garbhzadegi ( یگدزبرغ , variously translated
as ‘Westernization’, ‘Westoxification’, or ‘Occidentosis’), as, e. g. , pointedly
voiced by Iranian critic Jalal Al-e Ahmad (1923–1969) and Indonesian philoso-
pher Syed Muhammad al Naquib bin Ali al-Attas ( ساطعلابيقندمحمديسلا , b.
1931).18
Opposition to Western ideas and a search for ideological alternatives were
likewise witnessed in China during the epoch of early modernity. These were
intellectual crosscurrents against the novel and possibly Western-derived Chi-
nese ideas of historicity mentioned by Hu. One such counterculture arose from
the ranks of Buddhist scholars who created a revivalism of Indian and Chinese
Buddhist Yogācāra philosophy (唯識 wéishì) in order to set forth an advanced
Asian phenomenological alternative to the epistemology of Western science and
the humanities.19 It was as part of this broader trend in Buddhist studies that
Chinese historian Zhāng Tàiyán (章太炎, 1868–1936) attempted to formulate a
new Chinese theory of history in the early twentieth century based partly on the
doctrinal principles of Buddhist Yogācāra thought.20 Notably, resistance to the
tacit secularist premises of theWestern humanities is still subtly present today in
much of the scholarship of Buddhist historians in South Korea and possibly in
other parts of East Asia.21
18 For more on the critical views of Al-e Ahmad and al-Attas, see Carl W. Ernst, “The West and
Islam? RethinkingOrientalism andOccidentalism”, in: Ishraq: Islamic Philosophy Yearbook 1
(2010), pp. 23–34.
19 For detailed historical accounts, see Chen Bing (陳兵), “Reflections on the Revival of Yo-
gācāra inModern Chinese Buddhism” and Eyal Aviv, “The Root that Nourishes the Branches:
The Role of the Yogācārabhūmi in 20th-Century Chinese Scholastic Buddhism” both pu-
blished in: Ulrich Timme Kragh (ed.), The Foundation for Yoga Practitioners: The Buddhist
Yogācārabhūmi Treatise and Its Adaptation in India, East Asia, and Tibet, Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2013, pp. 1054–1076 and pp. 1078–1091.
20 For Zhāng Tàiyán’s contribution to Chinese historical theory, see Axel Schneider and Stefan
Tanaka, “The Transformation of History in China and Japan”, in: The Oxford History of
Historical Writing, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, vol. 4, pp. 506–517, and further
Viren Murthy, “Equalisation as Difference: Zhang Taiyan’s Buddhist-Daoist Response to
Modern Politicsˮ in: The Newsletter 44 (The International Institute for Asian Studies 2007),
pp. 24–25.
21 Seongcheol Kim, “A Brief History of Studies on the Yogācāra School in Modern Koreaˮ, in:
The Foundation for Yoga Practitioners: The Buddhist Yogācārabhūmi Treatise and Its
Adaptation in India, East Asia, and Tibet, p. 1265. For amore detailed discussion, see Jaekwan
Shim (심재관), Talsigminsidae uliui bulgyohag (탈식민시대 우리의 불교학) [Korean
Buddhology in the Postcolonial Period], Seoul: Chaeksesang, 2001.
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Given the presence of dissent arising from deep within the non-Western
power-knowledge systems against the influence of foreign ideas, it is evident that
it is neither right to view the development of new ideas within these epistemes as
simply being peripheral derivatives of Western core ideas, nor is it wholly ap-
propriate to characterize premodern traditions of non-Western thought as
conforming to or being included in a universal humanism, as it is for example
done in a recent book on the worldwide history of the humanities.22
3. The Cultural
On a slightly deeper level of analysis, the dependency theory of ideas presupposes
that there exists a clear and discernible separation between disparate cultures,
which would allow for the theory’s fundamental distinction of a core and a
periphery. The conception of such self-evident cultural rifts – whether assumed
to exist based on linguistic, national, or racial differences – imposes on the theory
a dogma of ethnocentrism. While it may be true, as argued by some, that every
discourse set in a particular historical cultural circumstance is burdened by an
inextricable sense of ethnocentrism,23 it is conspicuous that the superimposition
of said cultural boundaries erects a sinister imagination of the notorious, ever-
impendent clash of civilizations.24 Markedly, Huang’s use of humanism as an
epistemic category for characterizing traditional Chinese historical thinking
leads him in some passages to introduce certain comparisons between Chinese
and European cultures and religions which seem intended mainly to underscore
China as being the superior, older civilization also with regard to the idealistic
principles behind humanism.
Yet, strong belief in the disjunction between cultures proves mistaken. The
absence of any absolute separation is not solely an ethical concern of “different
skin colors, same suffering”. Rather, it is a matter of the fictionality of a ho-
mogeneous cultural identity, which the notion of a monoculture presupposes.25
22 Rens Bod, A New History of the Humanities: The Search for Principles and Patterns from
Antiquity to the Present, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.
23 Eric Hayot, Haun Saussy, and Steven G. Yao, “Sinographies: An Introductionˮ, in: Sinogra-
phies: Writing China, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008, p. vii, xx.
24 For the full assertion of a civilizational clash, see Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civi-
lizations: Remaking of a World Order, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.
25 On the problem of cultural homogeneity in the dependency theory of ideas, see Elías José
Palti, “The Problem of ‘Misplaced Ideas’ Revisited: Beyond the ‘History of Ideas’ in Latin
Americaˮ, in: Journal of the History of Ideas 67.1 (2006), pp. 149–179, p. 175. Further, on the
artificiality of the historical construction of the notion of nationality, see Benedict Anderson,
Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, London: Verso,
1991.
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The problem that lies in thinking along the lines of artificial cultural boundaries
becomes apparent, when it is brought into consideration that many of the key
arguments of resistance against Western culture that have been employed by
contemporary non-Western critics have been derived from within Western cul-
ture itself, whether these arguments be nihilist, Marxist, existentialist, or
postmodern.26
4. The Semantical
A consequence of cultural disjunction is semantic conjunction, referring to the
coexistence of two or more distinct elements within a single time and place.
When the cultural-ideological dogmas ‘Occident’ and ‘Orient’ lose their absolute
signification, the result is a fusion of ideas, where periphery and core, old and
new, native and foreign meet and merge. Bhabha has argued that colonialism
created a hybridity of cultures involving mimicry and bastardization, which led
to the estrangement and ambivalence of original symbols and ideas.27 Similarly,
in her work on early modernity in Japan, Gluck has compared global con-
junctural modernity to a universal grammar that takes on different inflections
around the world resulting in particular local ‘historical blends’ that make up
what she calls ‘blended modernity’.28
However, with ‘hybridization’ and ‘blending’ there is, in fact, no longer any
semantic basis for speaking of a distinct power-knowledge system of any given
culture, neither Western nor non-Western, in the era after the onset of colo-
nialism, modernity, post-colonialism, and the global information society. Al-
though “China and the world” remains a literary trope that began to be nego-
tiated already in early modernity,29 the ultimate ramification of hybridization
and blending is that it is just not possible to describe a “Chinese historical
thinking” after the eighteenth century, because there no longer exists a distinct,
inalienable entity that might be defined as being purely ‘Chinese’. With the
vacancy of any stable feature definable as ‘Chinese’, the very topic inHu’s essay of
locating and describing Chinese historical thinking in modernity becomes an
empty category (śunya, 空 kōng), and consequently the whole question of
26 For a convincing analysis thereof, see Ernst, “The West and Islam?ˮ, p. 29.
27 Homi K. Bhabha, “Sign Taken forWonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority under a
Tree outside Delhi,May 1817ˮ, in:The Location of Culture, London: Routledge, 1994, pp. 102–
122, p. 112.
28 Carol Gluck, “The End of Elsewhere: Writing Modernity Nowˮ, in: American Historical
Review ( June 2011), pp. 676–687.
29 For a detailed historical and literary analysis of the trope, see Haun Saussy, “China and the
World: The Tale of a Toposˮ, in: Modern Language Quarterly 68.2 (2007), pp. 145–171.
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whether modern Chinese historical ideas are native or imported vanishes along
with the related problem of whether there exists a dependency of ideas between
cultural cores and peripheries.
5. The Syntactical
Beneath the overall ideological, cultural, and semantical layers of analysis, there
lies an even more rudimentary stratum of meaning-production, which pertains
to the basic linguistic principles by which words come to be attributed with
meaning. Linguistic signs are not reducible to positive terms possessing inherent
meaning.30 Rather, the assigned signification of a given word only remains stable
for as long as the linguistic convention (vyavahāra, 世俗語言 shìsú yǔyán) as-
sociated with the word endures. Since linguistic conventions presuppose larger
social contexts that are defined by traditions, education, and ideologies, mean-
ing-production is always contextual. That is to say, ideas of historical thinking
should not exclusively be viewed on the semantic level as enduring conceptual
entities whose historiesmay be traced diachronically butmust simultaneously be
regarded on the syntactic level as contextually-defined notions whose meanings
need to be understood synchronically. Hence, humanismmay either be viewed as
having a stable meaning derived from the European history of ideas or as being
contextually defined, in which case the word, in fact, does not at all carry the same
connotations when it is used in the three different contexts at hand: classical
China, early modern Europe, and present-day Taiwan.
The need for moving beyond a strictly static view of enduring ideas as pre-
supposed by the dependency theory and instead studying histories of ideas in a
manner where ideas are variously understood according to their individual
contexts is a critical point, as argued by Palti.31 Yet, Palti’s solution does not
afford a precise explanation of meaning-production that would account for the
simultaneity of diachronic continuity and synchronic discontinuity. When a
term is interpreted strictly according to its synchronic context, there is risk of
losing the term’s diachronic continuity of meaning. For instance, when Huang
andWong characterize classical Chinese historical thinking as being humanist, a
purely contextual hermeneutics demands the word ‘humanism’ to be dis-
associated from its meanings in other power-knowledge systems, enforcing a
signification specific to the modern Taiwanese context rather than European
30 On the absence of positive terms in language, see Ferdinand de Saussure, Cours de lingui-
stique générale, Paris: Éditions Payot & Rivages, 1916, p. 166.
31 The need for contextualization in the dependency theory of ideas was raised by Palti, “The
Problem of ‘Misplaced Ideas’ Revisitedˮ, pp. 169–173.
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thought. The negative consequence thereof is a disjointed and too austere
reading of humanismwholly devoid of diachronic dependency of the term on the
Occidental history of ideas without allowing for any interplay across epistemes.
It is therefore exigent to suggest a different approach to the study of the history
of ideas that equally emphasizes diachronic dependency and synchronic in-
dependency. What is needed is to operate with a sense of meaning-production
that considers meaning as being ‘transformative’ (parin
˙
āma, 變異 biànyì).
Transformative meaning-production implies that ideas are interpreted syn-
chronically as possessing new meanings which are specific to their syntactic
context, but their new meanings are diachronic transformations of earlier
meanings of the terms which reach back to previous semantic instances forming
a series of discursive prehistories.
For example, in case of Huang’s and Wong’s uses of the word ‘humanism’ to
characterize classical Chinese historiography, the word humanism needs, on the
one hand, to be read synchronically from within the specific context of twenty-
first-century Taiwan, which ultimately is a meaning-production that only can be
understood from the interior semiotic meaning-structures of Huang’s and
Wong’s essays. On the other hand, the Taiwanese meaning of the English word
‘humanism’ is a transformation of an idea reaching back to a series of earlier
instances of the term, including the premodern and later European senses of the
term, the Chinese adaptations of the idea that evolved during the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries, and the new senses with which the word has come to be
imbued on Taiwan in the post-1949 Republic of China. The principle of trans-
formative logic allows for a reading that is sensitive to the individual hermeneutic
parameters of Huang, Wong, and Hu while concurrently permitting each idea
introduced in their essays to be viewed as standing in diachronic relationships to




Being a fundamental approach to studying cultural interplay, the principle of
transformative meaning-production can be applied to forms of interplay oc-
curring between different epistemes, as shown above in the dependency between
Occident and Orient in Taiwanese discourses on humanism. Parallelly, when
applied to histories of ideas within a single power-knowledge system, the prin-
ciple highlights how given ideas are contextualized transformations of earlier
ideas and how these transformations entail dependencies on closely aligned
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epistemes. Within Chinese historical thinking, transformative logic may thus not
only reveal continuities of Chinese intellectual history but also connections to
inter-Asian histories of ideas.
For instance, in the essay Historical Discourses in Traditional Chinese His-
torical Writings: Historiography as Philosophy,32 Huang draws attention to an
important turn that Chinese historiography took in the twelfth century, when the
Neo-Confucian thinker Zhū Xı̄ (朱熹 1130–1200) introduced a new theory of
“principle and event” (理事 lı̌shì). In the ensuing centuries, Zhū Xı̄’s theory led
Chinese historians to regard themoral principle behind a given historical event as
being the driving force behind historiography, thereby rendering history writing
into a form of moral critique. This remained the dominant interpretation of
history in China until the onset of modern Chinese historical thinking in the
eighteenth century, when Zhāng Xuéchéng rejected the view that the moral
principles of the Confucian classics were guiding historical events and instead
began to view the Confucian classics as historical events in and of themselves.
Nevertheless, while arguing for the importance of Zhū Xı̄’s theory in the
Chinese history of ideas, Huang limits his analysis to the specific Neo-Confucian
context of the twelfth century and thereby ignores the fact that Zhū Xı̄’s notions
of “principle and eventˮ are transformations of earlier ideas. In failing to account
for the diachronic prehistory of Zhū Xı̄’s notions, Huang falls into the predica-
ment of narrow synchronicity in the strict sense of Palti’s contextualized reading.
In fact, prior to Zhū Xı̄’s application of the “principle and event” theory (理事
lı̌shì) to historiography, the binary pair already existed as a well-established
analytical mode of “principle and phenomenaˮ (理事 lı̌shì) in the Buddhist
thought of the Korean Yogācāra exegeteWonhyo (元曉, S:元晓 617–686) and the
Chinese Buddhist Huáyán (華嚴) and Tiāntāi (天台) schools.33 More remotely,
these Chinese ideas reach back to the West, albeit a different ‘West’; not the
OccidentalWest (西方Xı̄fāng) but anotherWest (西域Xı̄yù) that was historically
important to China, namely India and Central Asia.34 Accordingly, the Chinese
Buddhist idea of ‘event’ or ‘phenomenon’ (事 shì) was ultimately derived from
the Indian Buddhist notion of concrete phenomenon (vastu). In light thereof,
Zhū Xı̄’s contribution to Chinese historical theory ought not to be seen as syn-
chronically limited to its Neo-Confucian context but should additionally be
32 Published in this book.
33 For a detailed analysis of the Buddhist background to the Chinese theory of principle and
event, see Brook Ziporyn, Ironies of Oneness and Difference: Coherence in Early Chinese
Thought: Prolegomena to the Study of Li, Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 2012 and
Beyond Oneness and Difference: Li and Coherence in Chinese Buddhist Thought and Its
Antecedents, Albany: State Univ. of New York Press, 2013.
34 For a similar problem of ambiguity of the word ‘West’ in Arabic, see Ernst, “The West and
Islam?ˮ, p. 25, fn. 6.
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viewed diachronically as a transformative meaning-production dependent on a
series of earlier Indian and Chinese Buddhist ideas.
As maintained previously, dependencies elicit reactions of intentional or
unintentional ideological resistance, and ZhūXı̄ is no exception in this regard, for
by asserting a Confucian pedigree of his ideas, he circumspectly avoids ac-
knowledging reliance on Buddhist sources. Notwithstanding that “principle and
event” first became conjoined as a binary analytical pair in the Buddhist liter-
ature of the seventh to tenth centuries, his kowtow to the Confucian intellectual
heritage, theBook of Changes (易經) in particular, intimates dependencies in Zhū
Xı̄’s thought being transformations of even older layers of the Chinese history of
ideas. These primordial strata in the knowledge archaeology of Chinese historical
thinking have recently been excavated in Wai-yee Li’s thorough study of the Zuǒ
zhuàn (左傳), one of the earliest Chinese historical chronicles dating to the
fourth century BCE, traditionally regarded as a commentary on the Confucian
classic the Spring and Autumn Annals (春秋 Chūnqiū).35
Stepping back into the mindset of the earliest Chinese chronicles uncovers
relics of an ancient Chinese historical consciousness that differs fundamentally
from the emphasis on moral principles found in Neo-Confucian thought as
exemplified by the writings of Zhū Xı̄ as well as the historical analyses of Huang.
Li’s study reveals the dominant principle for historical meaning-production in
the Zuǒ zhuàn to be prognostication, given the text’s underlying concern with
foreboding signs and omens, where small apparently inconsequential causes in
the form of gestures, words, dreams, or actions were interpreted as giving rise to
momentous and often ominous consequences.36
Notably, the Chinese preoccupation with prognostication and divination
dates right back to the very earliest extant sources of Chinese writing, i. e. , the
Bronze Age turtle shell oracle bones (甲骨 jiǎgǔ), and is likewise predominant in
the Book of Changes, which Zhū Xı̄ takes as the point of departure for his ideas of
“principle and event”. Hence, unlike Huang’s and Wong’s suggestion of an ev-
erlasting spirit of humanism in Chinese historical thinking, what is at hand is a
series of transformative meaning-productions starting with instances of viewing
historical causality as ruled by prognostic laws, via Chinese Buddhist ideas of
higher principles and concrete phenomena, over to Neo-Confucian ideologies of
the driving force of morality.
A given idea, whether Huang’s and Wong’s humanism in Chinese historical
thinking or ZhūXı̄’s Neo-Confucian theory of “principle and eventˮ, may thus be
read synchronically within its own specific disjointed context as well as dia-
35 Wai-yee Li, The Readability of the Past in Early Chinese Historiography, Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 2007.
36 See Li, The Readability of the Past, pp. 85–171.
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chronically as being a transformation of meaning that stands as the continuation
of multiple discursive prehistories. In conclusion, the meaning-production of
Chinese historical thinking seems out of reach for any characterization that
reduces it either to a mode of dependency on Occidental dogmas, such as the
episteme of humanism, or to an isolationist mode of Oriental dogmas viewing it
purely as an independent Chinese intellectual tradition that is perpetually en-
dowed with originality.
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